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THREE ESSAYS ON GROCERY SALES TAXES 
 
Grocery sales taxes represent a stable tax revenue stream for state and municipal 
government, but there is rare empirical evidence suggesting grocery taxes may adversely 
affect health. In addition, the how governments set grocery sales taxes is still unclear. 
Therefore, based on a novel national dataset of annual county and state-level grocery taxes 
from 2009 through 2016, the following three essays in the dissertation investigate the 
health impacts of grocery sales taxes and the causes of grocery sales taxes in a framework 
of tax competition.  
 
In the first essay, we document the spatial and temporal variation in grocery taxes and 
empirically examine the statistical relationship between county-level grocery taxes and 
obesity and diabetes. We link the tax data to three-year, county-level estimates based on 
data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on rates of obesity and diabetes 
and provide a nation-wide spatial characterization of grocery taxes and these two health 
outcomes. Using a county-level fixed effects estimator, we estimate the effect of grocery 
taxes on obesity and diabetes rates, also controlling for a subset of potential confounders 
that vary over time. We find a one percentage point increase in grocery taxes is associated 
with 0.588 and 0.215 percentage point increases in the county-level obesity and diabetes 
rates. In conclusion, Counties with grocery taxes have increased prevalence of obesity and 
diabetes. We estimate the economic burden of increased obesity and diabetes rates resulting 
from grocery taxes to be $5.9 billion. Based on this estimate, the benefit-cost ratio of 
removing grocery taxes is 1.90 across the United States if we only consider the effects on 
obesity and diabetes rates. 
 
In the second essay, we aim to examine whether grocery sales taxes make significant 
impacts on individual’s body weight outcome. We merged the county-level grocery tax 
data with the individual longitudinal data from Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID) and 
explore a fixed effect model to estimate the causal impact of grocery sales taxes on family 
food expenditures and individual BMI (Body Mass Index). After that, we conduct the 
analysis of heterogeneous effects by income category and obesity level to identify the 
policy impacts on different individuals and families. We find that a ten point-percentage 
increase in grocery sales rate leads to a rise of BMI by 0.61 (which roughly translates to a 
body weight gain of 1.68kg). The results are more significant for the overweight population 
whose BMI is greater than 25 but smaller than 30. We do not find significant results 
towards different income population.  
 
In the third essay, we study the state-county tax policy interaction patterns and explore the 
causes of grocery sales tax changes considering spatial externalities under a Stackelberg 
tax competition model with three propositions. Derivatized from the model, county grocery 
tax rates are affected by states’ grocery tax rates (vertical effects), neighboring counties’ 
     
 
grocery tax rates (horizontal effects) and neighboring states’ grocery tax rates (diagonal 
effects). By employing the twelve-year data of state and county grocery taxes, we also 
empirically examine the three propositions in a spatial autoregressive model. The empirical 
results are consistent with the three theoretical proportions. The average county grocery 
sales tax rate is less than the average state grocery sales tax rate, and we find the county 
grocery tax rate changes negatively with its domestic state grocery sales tax rate. 
Neighboring counties play a large role in determining the local county grocery tax rates.  
For example, a county will increase its grocery tax rates by 0.780-point percentages if its 
neighboring county increases one percentage point tax rate on average. Neighboring state 
tax rates can also positively affect a county’s grocery tax rate. A county is expected to 
increase its grocery tax rate by 0.110 percentage point when its neighboring states increase 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Grocery sales taxes were first levied over the Great Depression, yet during the past two 
decades, seven states have consecutively exempted grocery sales taxes, which provoked an 
intense discussion on the impacts of grocery sales taxes and repeals of the taxes. Some 
researchers argued that “the persistence for the grocery tax is strange” because most local 
governments have already given up taxing groceries (Tate, 2018). Indeed, only thirteen 
states persist on the taxes, five of which levy the taxes at limited rates, and three of which 
provide different levels of tax refund credits. However, policymakers in the with-tax states 
are unwilling to cut the grocery sales taxes because the taxes contribute considerably to the 
local government finances.  
In most states and counties, grocery sales tax rates are different from general sales 
tax rates. Since the Great Depression when general sales states were created, some states 
and governments have decided to exempt groceries from the sales taxes. This is where the 
tax division come from. More divisions come up when some states and counties levy 
grocery taxes at limited rates, while some levy at the same rates as general sales taxes (full 
rates). The dissertation focusses on the grocery sales tax policy instead of the general sales 
taxes. 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that explore the impacts and causes 
of the grocery tax changes and discuss repealing the tax. Although a few studies have 
investigated the impacts of grocery sales taxes on food related outcomes, there are also 
topics that remain unexplored. First, there is no empirical research investigating the 
impacts of grocery taxes on health outcomes such as obesity and diabetes. Second, most of 
the research fails to track the causal influence due to the limit of micro panel data.  Third, 
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there is limited academic analysis on the causes of grocery sales tax changes in the 
framework of tax competition, even though over 100 counties changed grocery sales tax 
rates more than 300 times during the past decade, according to the tax data we collected 
and used in this dissertation. Therefore, in the dissertation, the three essays emphasizing 
on the above blank aspects target to enrich the investigation of grocery sales taxes. 
The first essay examines the impact of grocery taxes on health outcomes, including 
obesity and diabetes. The income effects and substitution effects of grocery taxes change 
consumers’ food choices, finally influencing people’s weights and blood sugar levels. By 
exploiting U.S. county-level data from 2009 to 2016, and controlling for other socio-
economic factors, results from the multiple linear regression show that higher grocery sales 
taxes are associated with higher obesity.  
The second essay follows the association found in the first essay, aiming to identify 
the causal impacts of grocery taxes on body weight outcome using individual longitudinal 
data. The county grocery taxes are merged with the family and individual level data from 
PSID. By employing the fixed-effect model, the reduction impacts of grocery sales taxes 
on body weight are found. In our preferred model, one point percentage decrease in grocery 
tax rate leads to 0.061 BMI decrease translating to 0.168 kg reduction in body weight on 
average.  
The last essay explores the causes of grocery sales tax changes considering both 
spatial externalities and vertical externalities. Based on a spatial econometric model, the 
grocery tax rate of a county is positively affected by its neighbor counties and states, 
showing the evidence of spatial autocorrelation of grocery tax among counties. Vertical 
interaction also plays a significant role, and we find evidence that county-level tax rates 
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increase as state-level tax rates decrease given that the average county-level tax rate is 
smaller than the state-level tax rate. 
Taxing groceries is a pivotal decision for local governments, and the grocery tax 
rates are also important food policies that influence every citizen’s life. Although there are 
passionate debates on tax exemption for groceries in the society amongst policy makers, 
the impacts and motivations of cutting the taxes have not been thoroughly examined. 





CHAPTER 2. GROCERY FOOD TAXES AND U.S. COUNTY OBESITY AND DIABETES RATES 
2.1 Introduction 
Grocery sales taxes (hereafter referred as grocery taxes) are sales taxes imposed on grocery 
foods and exist in the form of a state tax, a county tax, or both in sixteen U.S. states. Taxing 
groceries is an attractive revenue source for state and municipal governments because 
grocery sales are relatively stable; thus, protecting facilitates budgeting planning even 
during times of economic downturn. Of course, grocery taxes make grocery foods more 
expensive, which society may feel most during times of economic downturn as lower 
income households become even more food insecure. For example, coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic began in early 2020 and food insecurity sky-rocketed in the 
United States—in April 2020, food insecurity increased to 23%.i  Not surprisingly, food 
insecurity is associated with social problems (particularly for children) such as health 
(Cook et al., 2004; Dunifon & Kowaleski-Jones, 2003; Weinreb et al., 2002), psychological 
(Alaimo, Olson, & Frongillo, 2001), and behavioral problems (Slack & Yoo, 2005; 
Whitaker, Phillips, & Orzol, 2006); therefore, policies thought to impact food insecurity 
and health have been extensively studied. Notably, there are studies that have analyzed the 
impacts of specific food taxes, such as soda taxes, on consumption and health. Recent 
examples include studies showing that at-risk subpopulations such as obese children 
coming from low-income families are more sensitive to soda taxes (J. M. Fletcher, D. E. 
Frisvold, & N. Tefft, 2010c; Sturm, Powell, Chriqui, & Chaloupka, 2010).   
In contrast, the relationship between grocery taxes and health outcomes has 
received little attention.  This is somewhat surprising given that relative to soda taxes, 
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grocery taxes are far more common, a significantly larger percentage tax on average, and 
they apply to all grocery foods so represent a considerably larger share of household 
income. The current lack of research on the impacts of grocery taxes is unfortunate since 
it is during times of economic hardship, such as a COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease 2019) 
induced recession, that policies such as grocery taxes receive greater consideration as a 
source of stable tax revenue for state and local governments. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Grocery taxes can affect the odds of eating at home versus dining out through changing the 
relative effective prices (tax included price) of grocery and restaurant foods. Compared 
with states such as New York where restaurant foods are taxed while grocery foods are tax 
exempt, taxing both grocery and restaurant foods in states like Alabama creates more of a 
disincentive to eat at home (French, 2003). For the poorest segment of the population, fast 
food restaurants become their primary option as a substitute for grocery foods because fast 
food restaurants are both more accessible (Powell, Chaloupka, & Bao, 2007; Rydell et al., 
2008) and cheaper (Khan, Powell, & Wada, 2012). In particular, two recent empirical 
studies show that grocery taxes reduced U.S. consumers’ grocery food expenditures and 
increased restaurant food expenditure, and restaurant food sales taxes increased U.S. 
consumers’ grocery food expenditures (Dong, Zheng, & Stewart, 2020; Zheng, Dong, 
Burney, & Kaiser, 2019b). Therefore, the substitution from grocery food to fast food in 
response to taxing groceries may increase the odds of unhealthy outcomes since there is 
evidence that consumption of fast food affects a person’s risk of becoming both obese 
(Chou, Grossman, & Saffer, 2004) and diabetic (Pereira et al., 2005).  
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Unlike soda or fat taxes, grocery taxes apply to thousands of grocery items and may 
effectively change consumers’ grocery food choices. Though not all grocery foods are 
healthy, reduced consumption of fruits and vegetables may induce obesity (Darmon & 
Drewnowski, 2015) and diabetes (Popkin, 2015), and food-at-home is widely considered 
healthier than food-away-from-home. Therefore, we hypothesize that health outcomes are 
negatively correlated with grocery taxes. We choose two health outcome measures for this 
study: obesity and diabetes rates within a county, because food consumption is closely 
related to obesity and diabetes.  
It is well known that individuals gain weight whenever consumed calories exceeds 
expended calories (Finkelstein, Ruhm, & Kosa, 2005). Yet, rates of obesity vary 
significantly from person to person according to the individual’s social economic status 
(McLaren, 2007) like education (Cohen, Rai, Rehkopf, & Abrams, 2013), income (Pickett, 
Kelly, Brunner, Lobstein, & Wilkinson, 2005), gender (Kanter & Caballero, 2012), age, 
and race (Wolf et al., 1993). In addition, individual body mass index (BMI) is also highly 
related with individual risky behavior such as smoking (Courtemanche, Tchernis, & Ukert, 
2018) and alcohol consumption (Sayon-Orea, Martinez-Gonzalez, & Bes-Rastrollo, 2011). 
However, these individual-level reasons do not explain fully the increasing prevalence of 
obesity across the entire society over time.   
Researchers from multiple disciplines have identified various underlying causes of 
obesity epidemic from different perspectives, such as decreasing price per calorie (Darmon 
& Drewnowski, 2015), high availability of fast food, high cost of healthy food (Wiggins et 
al., 2015), difficulty to access healthy food especially for lower-income households (Jetter 
& Cassady, 2006), and the high amount of marketing of unhealthy food and beverages 
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especially among younger children (Harris, Pomeranz, Lobstein, & Brownell, 2009). 
While the evidence is mixed, some studies have identified physical inactivity as a cause 
for obesity, attributed to urban sprawl (Vandegrift & Yoked, 2004), labor-saving devices 
such as dish washers (Ng & Popkin, 2012), and increasingly sedentary occupations (Thorp, 
Owen, Neuhaus, & Dunstan, 2011). Similar to findings in the obesity literature, the rising 
rates of diabetes has been attributed in part to environmental factors, such as the abundance 
of food supply and sedentary lifestyles (Barnett, Eff, Leslie, & Pyke, 1981; Marx, 2002; 
Zimmet, 1982). In fact, 60% of diabetes cases can be attributed to being obese or 
overweight (Ezzati, Lopez, Rodgers, & Murray, 2004).  
In terms of magnitude, the quantitative significance for obesity and diabetes risk 
factors also varies widely. For instance, quitting smoking has been found to reduce body 
mass index (BMI) by 1.8-1.9 units with a BMI above 30 defining obesity (Courtemanche 
et al., 2018). As a separate example, a one percent increase in soda taxes has been 
associated with a 0.013 decrease in average BMI (Sturm et al., 2010). Overall, there is not 
clear consensus on the aggregate effects of different risk factors on either obesity or 
diabetes rates, especially among individual studies that examine specific sub-populations. 
In summary, the public health literature has identified a multitude of causes for the 
rising obesity and diabetes epidemic in the United States, including prices, food availability 
and accessibility, and marketing. The aim of this study is to examine another potential 
factor which has not been investigated previously: the relationship between grocery food 
taxes and health outcomes.  Despite the fact that groceries are taxed in one third of U.S. 
states as well as on-going debates on whether to impose significant grocery taxes (e.g., 
New Mexico and West Virginia) to our knowledge there is, no comprehensive dataset on 
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state and county-level grocery taxes. Therefore, one contribution of our work is the 
development of a comprehensive dataset on state and county-level grocery taxes from 2009 
through 2016, which we then link to county-level estimates of obesity and diabetes rates. 
The main empirical contribution of our work is to estimate the effect of grocery taxes on 
these two important health outcomes using our novel county-level panel data and a county 
fixed effects estimator that also includes time-varying variables to control for 
socioeconomic factors, risky behaviors, and food access and affordability environment. A 
third contribution is policy-focused, we calculate benefit-cost ratios of eliminating grocery 
taxes as a way to assess the quantitative significance of grocery taxes in determining 
obesity and diabetes rates. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Data Organization and Structure 
We organize county-level panel data consisting of six time periods on obesity and diabetes 
rates, food taxes, socioeconomic characteristics, and risky health behaviors. Each of the six 
periods is three years in length; thus, the unit of observation in the statistical analysis is the 
county-three-year period.  Each of the six periods in the study has a one-year overlap with 
the subsequent period or the preceding period or both—Figure 1 depicts this somewhat 
unique structure of our county-level panel data and empirical design. We develop this data 
structure because the outcome variables of obesity and diabetes rates are only precisely 
estimated and reported based on the average of a three year-sample window. Concordance 
on the timing of measurements between the health outcome variables and the explanatory 
variables requires that the food tax, socioeconomic, and risky health behavior variables 
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also be measured as three-year averages. A separate justification for measuring each 
variable as a three-year average is that the adjustment of diets due to a tax change, and any 
subsequent transition to or from obesity is not likely immediate.   
2.3.2 Data Sources 
We assemble a large set of data on state- and county-level grocery tax rates in the U.S. 
from 2009 to 2016. The key independent variable of interest in this study is the total grocery 
sales tax, measured as a percentage. The total tax is the sum of the state-level and county-
level grocery sales taxes. We also collect data on restaurant sales taxes, which we use to 
calculate the ratio of the grocery to restaurant sales tax as an alternative explanatory 
variable. The tax data are obtained from Bridging the Gap for state tax rates, Tax-Rates.org 
for 2016 county rates, and state Departments of Revenue for the rest (by online searching 
by two research assistants over an extended period of time). 
Comparing with the panel data source of sales tax rates assembled by other 
researchers (Agrawal, 2014, 2015), our dataset does not include municipal tax rates. 
However, it is the first panel dataset that focuses on grocery tax rates, instead of general 
sales tax rates. In addition, it contains national grocery tax data of state and county level 
for as long as twelve years.  
We assess two dependent variables in our analyses: 1) three-year county-level 
obesity prevalence; and 2) three-year county-level diabetes prevalence. County-level rates 
of diagnosed obesity and diabetes are obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) county data indicators (Centers for Disease Control Prevention, 2016), 
which are three-year average rates calculated by CDC using annual surveys from the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) (Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention, 2018) and are based on a three-year average to improve precision. For both 
obesity and diabetes outcomes we use age-adjusted rates to measure the health outcomes.  
We collect data for control variables in the regression analysis from multiple 
sources on a wide range of socioeconomic data measured at the annual level. To conform 
the explanatory variables with the dependent variable, we use the annual socioeconomic 
data to construct three-year county level averages for use as control variables in the 
regression analysis. The first set includes food environment/access/affordability including 
the numbers of grocery stores, fast food restaurants, and full-service restaurants, and the 
average cost per meal. The former three variables are from the Census Bureau’s County 
Business Patterns (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018) and the latter is from Feeding America 
(Feeding America, 2018). Socioeconomic measures on population, race, gender income, 
employment and education are based on data from the Census Bureau’s Population 
Estimates Program (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018.). The per capita income and employment 
rate are from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) (U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2017).  
Additional control variables include data on risky health behaviors, which are also 
at the annual level and used for constructing three-year county-level averages. The county-
level prevalence estimates of smoking and alcohol use are obtained from BRFSS. Smoking 
is measured as the percentage of adults in a county who both report that they currently 
smoke every day or most days and have smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime. 
Excessive alcohol use is the percentage of adults that report excessive alcohol consumption 
in the past 30 days in each county. Data on drug-possession and driving under the influence 
(DUI) arrests are obtained from the County Level Detailed Arrest and Offense Data 
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supported by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program (U.S. Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2018). We divide the arrests by county population from REIS to obtain per capita 
possessing-drug and DUI arrests.  
In total we have tax data for 3,101 U.S. counties. We only keep 2,446 counties in 
the dataset due to our study design. Moreover, 408 counties are lost when merging in 
socioeconomic variables. After eliminating the 180 singleton counties, we are left with 
1,858 counties including both urban and rural counties in the dataset. Of these counties, 87 
experienced a grocery tax change in the year 2012, 2013 or 2014. The other 1,771 counties 
experienced no grocery tax change during the study window (2009 – 2016); 1,250 of these 
counties never have a grocery tax, while 521 have a constant grocery tax during the study 
window. In terms of our entire panel of county-period observations, we only keep 
observations for which the grocery tax is constant within the three-year period. As a 
consequence, counties with grocery tax changes appear in exactly two periods each, which 
correspond to either 1) the three-year periods before and after 2012, 2) the three-year 
periods before and after 2013, or 3) the three-year periods before and after 2014. Counties 
with no tax grocery tax changes during our study window will appear in each of the six 
periods unless there is missing data for covariates in a county for some years. If our panel 
of counties with no tax changes is balanced, then we would have 11,148 observations 
(1,858 counties by 6). Of the 1,771 counties without tax changes, 1,319 of them appear in 
all six periods. In terms of total county-period observations, we have, 9,979 observations; 
9,805 observations from our panel of counties that never experience a tax change and 174 
observations from counties that do experience a tax change. 
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2.3.3 Statistical Analysis 
We estimate the effects of grocery taxes on obesity and diabetes rates resulting from 
changes in county-level grocery taxes in the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. Our estimating 
procedure uses a county fixed effects linear regression model for county-level, age-
adjusted health outcomes. The main explanatory variables of interest are 1) grocery taxes 
and 2) restaurant taxes. Our main parameter of interest describes how changes in the 
county-level total grocery sales tax relates to county-level health outcomes on average, 
after parsing out other observable variables and unobservable time-constant variables. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for arbitrary intra-cluster 
correlations between the error terms (Cameron & Miller, 2015). The regression model 
controls for county-level food access, demographics, socioeconomics, and risky health 
behaviors. The model also includes period fixed effects to control for period-specific time 
shocks common to all counties and county fixed effects to control for county-specific time-
invariant factors. 
 In addition to the main analysis described above, we assess the robustness of our 
results to an alternative measure of food taxes—the ratio of the grocery tax to the restaurant 
tax.  Because some counties have no restaurant tax, we add 0.01 to both the numerator and 
denominator. This adjustment has only a small influence on the ratio when then the 
restaurant tax is non-zero, which is the vast majority of observations. In all instances when 
the restaurant tax is zero, the grocery tax is also zero, which makes the ratio equal to one 
in such cases. To us this transformation is reasonable since it keeps intact the ratio when 
the denominator is non-zero and implies parity when the denominator is zero.  
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2.3.4 Calculation of Health Burden and Benefit-Cost Ratio  
We calculate the aggregate U.S. health burden of grocery tax rates in the year 2016 based 
on direct costs of treating obesity and diabetes and the cost of mortalities. Direct costs are 
measured as the medical expenditures for treating people with obesity and for treating 
people with diabetes; the cost of mortalities is measured as the value of statistical life 
(VSL). Our calculated estimates of annual expenditures (direct costs only) for treating 
obesity and diabetes are $1,901 (American Diabetes Association, 2018) and $9,601 (Kim 
& Basu, 2016), respectively. 
The first step to calculate these aggregate health burdens is to calculate the 
additional cases of people with obesity and diabetes at the county level. These counts are 
calculated based on multiplying the regression coefficients relating grocery taxes to obesity 
and diabetes by the grocery tax rate in a county, and then multiplying by the county 
population. These products deliver county-level estimates of the additional people with 
obesity and diabetes associated with an increase in the grocery tax rate. Next, we multiply 
these additional cases of people with obesity and diabetes by our estimates of annual 
medical expenditures on obesity/diabetes, which deliver estimates of health burdens 
aggregated at the county level. To recover a national aggregate estimate, we aggregate our 
county-level estimates across all counties with grocery taxes. 
Next, we calculate benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) to summarize whether the health 
benefits associated with reducing the grocery tax by one percentage point are likely to 
exceed the cost of foregone tax revenues from the reduction. The numerator of the BCR 
captures the health benefits per person of reducing the grocery tax by one percentage point. 
This is calculated as the product of 1) the regression coefficient relating grocery taxes to a 
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health outcome, 2) a one percentage point tax reduction, and 3) our calculated estimate for 
annual expenditures on treatment. The denominator is the cost per person, in terms of 
foregone tax revenue, of reducing grocery taxes by one percentage point. The average 
annual food at-home expenditure of U.S. households was $4,363 (USDA ERS, Food 
Expenditure Series), which translates to $1630.78 per person assuming average household 
size was 2.6 (U.S. Census Bureau 2016); thus, a one percentage point reduction implies 
$16.31 per person in foregone annual grocery tax revenue. If the benefit-cost ratio exceeds 
one, then the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. We complete sensitivity analyses 
for both the health burden and benefit-cost ratio calculations using different estimates for 
the direct costs of treating obesity or diabetes for person with the condition. 
We found variations among cost estimates; for example, a meta-analysis found that 
the annual medical expenditures attributable to treating obesity for a person with the 
condition varies from $1,239 to $2,582 (Kim & Basu, 2016). Therefore, in a sensitivity 
analysis we consider low and high estimates for these figures. These results are 
summarized in Table 2.4.  
The health burden and BCR estimates do not take into account all of the potential 
adverse impacts of grocery taxes; for example, they do not consider the indirect costs of 
obesity or diabetes on quality of life or lost work productivity. We also note that obesity 
and diabetes are related; our estimates of health burden are based on the assumption that 
they are separate. It is possible that combining the health burden from obesity and diabetes 
produces an over-estimate. On the other hand, as we have already suggested, the grocery 
tax might be associated with other adverse effects for which we do not account (as another 
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example, household food insecurity). Not accounting for these other mechanisms would 
lead to an under-estimate.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 A Map of Grocery Taxes 
Figure 2 presents a map of the United States depicting county-level grocery taxes along 
with the top 12 most obese states identified in bold. This figure illustrates that grocery taxes 
are more prevalent in states with the highest obesity rates.  
2.4.2 Health Outcomes by Taxing Status 
Figure 3 plots the average rates of obesity and diabetes from 2009 through 2016 for both 
counties with and without a grocery tax (state, county, or both). Over this period, the 
national average obesity and diabetes rates increased significantly, especially after 2013. 
If we look at counties with and without grocery sales tax separately, the taxed counties are 
less healthy. Specifically, the average obesity and diabetes rates of counties with taxes are 
approximately 3 and 2.5 percentage points higher, respectively. Figure 3 clearly shows that 
counties with a grocery tax were consistently worse for both obesity and diabetes.  
2.4.3 Regression Results on Obesity and Diabetes Rates 
In Table 2.1 we present the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The 
first three columns in Table 2.2 report the regression results of obesity rates on grocery 
sales tax rates under a base specification with year fixed effects, the base specification 
augmented with county fixed effects, and a third specification that also adds time-varying 
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control variables. The results in columns 1, 2 and 3 are all similar with point estimates of 
0.707, 0.606 and 0.588, respectively.  Under all specifications, the grocery tax is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Our preferred specification reported in column 
3, which includes the most comprehensive controls (county fixed effects plus a number of 
factors identified in the literature), suggests that a one-percentage point increase in the 
grocery tax rate is associated with a 0.588 percentage point increase in the obesity rate. In 
contrast, the coefficient on the restaurant tax is a negative value  (-0.158), though it is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 The results in columns 4, 5 and 6 present the results for diabetes rates.  The point 
estimates of the associations between grocery sales tax and the prevalence of diabetes are 
0.400, 0.252 and 0.215, respectively.  Under all specifications, the grocery tax is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Our preferred specification reported in column 
6 suggests that a one-percentage point increase in the grocery tax rate is associated with a 
0.215 percentage point increase in the diabetes rate. Again, the coefficient on the restaurant 
tax is negative  (-0.127), though it is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 In Table 2.3 we assess the robustness of our results for both obesity and diabetes 
rates using an alternative food tax measure—the grocery tax to restaurant tax ratio is used 
as the main independent variable instead of the grocery tax. Results are consistent with 
those reported in Table 2.2 and are statistically significant at the 5% level for specifications 




We find evidence that grocery taxes have an adverse effect on both obesity and 
diabetes rates. Specifically, assuming our county fixed effects estimator is not biased by 
time-varying omitted variables, then a one percentage point increase in grocery taxes 
increases obesity and diabetes rates by 0.588 and 0.215 percentage points, respectively.   
 To put our results in context from a policy perspective, we calculate benefit-cost 
ratios (BCRs) to summarize whether the health benefits associated with reducing the 
grocery tax by one percentage point are likely to exceed the cost of foregone tax revenues 
from their reduction. Table 2.4 reports the ratios and Appendix 2 shows the detailed steps 
to obtain the ratios. 
Our preferred estimates of annual expenditures (direct costs only) for treating 
obesity and diabetes are $1,901 (Association, 2018). We also considered variations among 
cost estimates; for example, a meta-analysis found that the annual medical expenditures 
attributable to treating obesity for a person with the condition varies from $1,239 to $2,582 
(Kornfield, Huang, Vera, & Emery, 2015). Therefore, in a sensitivity analysis we consider 
low and high estimates for these figures, these results are also summarized in Table 2.4. 
The top portion of Table 2.4 summarizes our estimates of health burdens associated 
with grocery taxes. The aggregate U.S. health burden of grocery taxes in the year 2016 due 
to medical expenditures on obesity and diabetes is calculated to be $5.86 billion (95% C.I. 
is $1.81 billion to $10.30 billion).   
 The bottom portion of Table 2.4 summarizes the BCRs. The calculated BCRs for 
obesity and diabetes using our preferred estimates of medical expenditures are 0.666 (95% 
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C.I. is 0.324 to 1.008) and 1.23 (95% C.I. is 0.163 to 2.329), respectively. The BCR of 
these two factors combined is 1.896. Similar to health burden analysis we also summarize 
the results of our sensitivity analysis for the BCR.  Based on the sensitivity analysis and 
taking into account a range based on sampling variability of our regression output, our 
lowest estimate of the combined BCR is 1.289 and the highest is 2.601. 
Many states and local municipalities have recently considered changing their 
grocery tax, such as West Virginia in 2017 (proposing an 8% new tax) and Utah in 2018 
(proposing removing grocery taxes). States and counties that tax food need to understand 
that this policy is associated with adverse health outcomes. Our preliminary results suggest 
that officials in states that tax groceries should take a closer look at ways to lessen the 
potential burden of such taxes as a way to improve health outcomes for the community. 
Decreasing the grocery tax would reduce tax revenue, and government officials would need 
to look at alternative revenue generating options if it lowered grocery taxes. Another option 
to off-set the potential adverse effects of grocery taxes would be a tax credit, though it 
would have to be sufficiently large to off-set the tax. Further, it is not clear how a lump-
sum tax credit would affect the marginal responses to taxes we estimate in our analysis. 
Furthermore, we find that the ratio of the grocery tax to the restaurant sales tax is 
also positively associated with adverse health outcomes. In particular, a doubling of this 
tax ratio is found to increase obesity and obesity rates by an average of 0.773 and 0.21 
percentage point, respectively. This has policy implications that should be considered 
especially by states and counties that are either considering levying a grocery tax or 
eliminating it. It is possible the adverse health outcomes could be lessened if this relative 
tax ratio were lowered in states with grocery taxes. For example, one option would be to 
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consider a revenue neutral simultaneous decrease in the grocery tax and increase in the 
restaurant (particularly fast-food establishments) tax as a way to lessen adverse health 
outcomes. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Our county-level depiction of grocery taxes in the United States reflects the first 
comprehensive dataset on state and county-level grocery taxes and shows a clear spatial 
correlation between grocery taxes and nutrition-related health outcomes. The regression 
results, which are based on data county fixed effects estimator, shows a strong statistical 
relationship between grocery taxes and both obesity and diabetes. Several states and 
counties are actively considering the levying or removal of grocery taxes. Our study design 
is only one component of the costs (or benefits) of a grocery tax; nonetheless, the results 
are thought-provoking and suggest the possibility of a large health burden from grocery 
taxes and a benefit-cost ratio greater than one corresponding to reductions in the grocery 
tax. Based on our findings using a novel panel dataset combining comprehensive county-
level grocery tax data with county-level health outcome measures, we recommend both 
researchers and policy makers give further consideration to the removal of grocery taxes a 
possible mechanism to improve health outcomes. Meanwhile, more evidence would be 
required to pin down a mechanism through which grocery taxes may affect health 
outcomes, for example, more evidence on the potential link through fruit and vegetable 




Tables and Figures for Chapter 2 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of the Variables Used 
 
  Unit Mean S.D. Min Max 
Health Outcomes      
Obesity rate (age-adjusted diagnosed) % 30.419 4.84 10.7 47.6 
Diabetes rate (age-adjusted diagnosed) % 9.305 2.122 3.4 19.4 
Tax Variables      
Total grocery sales tax rate % 1.142 2.084 0.000 9.000 
Total restaurant sales tax rate % 6.036 1.686 0.000 9.933 
(1+Grocery Tax)/(1+Restaurant Tax)  0.340 0.328 0.093 1.000 
Socioeconomic Variables      
Grocery stores per capita 1/1000 0.221 0.14 0.017 1.701 
Fast-food restaurants per capita 1/1000 0.616 0.198 0.044 1.964 
Full-service restaurants per capita 1/1000 0.781 0.414 0.042 3.995 
Cost per meal $ 2.775 0.306 1.956 5.113 
White  0.857 0.145 0.093 0.991 
Black  0.087 0.133 0.000 0.85 
Female  0.502 0.016 0.366 0.553 
Hispanic  0.085 0.12 0.004 0.957 
Income per capita 1,000$ 39.014 10.899 18.768 199.241 
Employees' share of total population  0.527 0.144 0.219 3.213 
Share of bachelor’s degree or higher of 
the 25-year- and-over population % 21.983 9.291 5.967 72.867 
Smoking rate % 20.599 5.096 3.167 42.160 
Drinking rate % 15.331 4.947 1.6 35.933 
Drug arrest rate  0.005 0.04 0.000 1.893 
DUI  0.006 0.034 0.000 1.886 




Table 2.2 Regression Results of Health Outcomes on Respective Grocery and Restaurant 
Sales Taxes 
Dependent variable: Obesity Prevalence (unit: %, mean: 30.419, S.D.: 4.840)                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Diabetes Prevalence (unit: %, mean: 9.305, S.D.: 2.122) 
 Obesity Diabetes 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Total Grocery 
Sales Tax Rate (%) 
0.707*** 0.636*** 0.588*** 0.400*** 0.252** 0.215** 
(0.203) (0.153) (0.154) (0.118) (0.108) (0.098) 
Total Restaurant 
Sales Tax Rate (%) 
0.369* -0.147 -0.158 0.290*** -0.134 -0.127 
(0.194) (0.139) (0.127) (0.096) (0.111) (0.101) 
       
Observations 9,779 9,779 9,779 9,779 9,779 9,779 
R-squared 0.129 0.909 0.910 0.227 0.927 0.928 
Period FE 
(m_period = 6) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
County FE 
(m_county = 
1,858)   
Y   Y 
Controls   Y Y   Y Y 
Note: The results are presented in six columns from one to six. Standard errors are in 





Table 2.3 Regression Results of Health Outcomes on Grocery to Restaurant Sales Taxes 
Ratio 
Dependent variable: Obesity Prevalence (unit: %, mean: 30.419, S.D.: 4.840)                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Diabetes Prevalence (unit: %, mean: 9.305, S.D.: 2.122) 
 Obesity Diabetes 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Tax Ratio 
2.639 5.144*** 4.760*** 1.498 1.603*** 1.296** 
(1.721) (1.263) (1.169) (1.026) (0.594) (0.571) 
       
Observations 9,779 9,779 9,779 9,779 9,779 9,779 
R-squared 0.036 0.909 0.910 0.028 0.927 0.928 
Period FE (m_period = 
6) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
County FE (m_county = 
1,858)   Y   Y 
Controls   Y Y   Y Y 
Note: The results are presented in six columns from one to six. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. We calculate Tax Ratio as:  
(1+Grocery Tax) / (1+Restaurant Tax).   
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Table 2.4 Summary of Aggregate U.S. Health Burdens and Benefit-Cost Ratios with 
Sensitivity Analysis 
  1 2 3 
  Obesity Diabetes Total 
Aggregate U.S. health 
burdens (billions of USD)   
 
Low estimate 1.34 2.64 3.98  
(0.65, 2.03) (0.56, 5.00) (1.21, 7.03) 
Preferred estimate 2.06 3.8 5.86 
 (1.00, 3.11) (0.81, 7.19) (1.81, 10.30) 
High Estimate 2.79 5.24 8.03 
  (1.36, 4.23) (1.11, 9.92) (2.47, 14.15) 
Benefit-cost ratios                                                                       
(health benefits / cost of 
reduced tax revenue)  
  
 
Low estimate 0.434 0.855 1.289  
(0.211, 0.657) (0.091, 1.619) (0.302, 2.276) 
Preferred estimate 0.666 1.23 1.896 
 (0.324, 1.008) (0.163, 2.329) (0.487, 3.337) 
High Estimate 0.905 1.696 2.601 
  (0.440, 1.369) (0.181, 3.212) (0.621, 4.581) 
Note: The results are presented in three columns from one to three. In parentheses we 
report the 95% confidence interval derived from the sampling variability of the regression 










Period 1  
Counties with a tax change: 
36   Counties w/o tax 
change: 1,444 
    
2010 
Period 2                         
Counties with a tax change: 




Period 3                         
Counties with a tax change: 
8     Counties w/o tax 
change: 1,695 
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Counties with a tax change: 
36      Counties w/o tax 
change: 1,581 
2013 
Period 5                         
Counties with a tax change: 
43     Counties w/o tax 
change: 1,599 
2014 
Period 6                         
Counties with a tax change: 
8     Counties w/o tax 
change: 1,613 
2015   
2016     
 












Figure 2.3 Average Obesity and Diabetes Rates by Grocery Sales Taxes 
Sources: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and authors’ own data collection. 
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CHAPTER 3. CAUSAL IMPACT OF GROCERY SALES TAXES ON WEIGHT OUTCOME: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE PSID PANEL 
3.1 Introduction 
Grocery sales taxes exist in 16 states in the U.S., but their causal impacts on obesity remain 
unknown. Recently, there has been a trend of exempting or decreasing grocery sales tax 
rates in many states and counties to achieve more progressive tax systems. Although the 
major purpose of decreasing grocery sales taxes is not to prevent obesity, such food tax 
policy may unexpectedly affect people’s food choice and subsequent body weight.   
As a matter of fact, taxing food is not a novel policy instrument in local 
governments’ tool kit to control the increasing food-related health risks. Like any other 
food and beverage taxes, grocery sales taxes affect obesity through guiding people’s food 
consumption behaviour (Powell & Chriqui, 2011). If grocery sales tax rates decrease, the 
relative price of grocery food to restaurant food is lower. With people switching to grocery 
food due to this substitution effect, healthier diets likely follow, and the obesity issue is 
therefore mitigated. Unlike other food and beverage taxes which aims on limited specific 
types of items, grocery sales taxes have a larger tax base so that the decline of grocery taxes 
is expected to have a larger impact on reducing obesity. In other words, if the taxes 
increase, it can in turn aggravate prevalence of obesity and diabetes (L. Wang, Zheng, 
Buck, Dong, & Kaiser, 2021). 
It seems that the reduction of grocery sales taxes can effectively tackle the obesity 
issue according to the economic intuition above. In reality, the health impact of the taxes 
may not be as noticeable as expected.  First, food consumption may not be as sensitive as 
the price changes. As a review summarizes, price elasticities of most groceries are less than 
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one: the price elasticities of fruits and vegetables are  -0.70 and -0.59,  which indicates that 
groceries are inelastic (Andreyeva, Long, & Brownell, 2010). Second, it is pointed out by 
some researchers that taxes are not salient to some consumers (Chetty, Looney, & Kroft, 
2009; Zheng, McLaughlin, & Kaiser, 2012). If consumers are not able to realize tax 
changes, taxes then would not be effective in changing consumers’ grocery consumption, 
let alone improving diets and affecting body weight outcomes. Third, it takes tax policies 
a long time to affect consumers’ body weight (Goldman, Lakdawalla, & Zheng, 2009). If 
the study period is too short for consumers’ health to be affected, significant health impacts 
of grocery sales taxes cannot be found. Last but not least, genetics, gender, race and income 
contributed to heterogeneous health impacts, and some researchers found black, female 
and low-income populations are more sensitive to food taxes (Goryakin, Monsivais, & 
Suhrcke, 2017; Yaniv, Rosin, & Tobol, 2009). As a result, if the impacts are estimated 
without considering those demographic and income variables, the estimated impacts may 
be insignificant. 
Considering the heterogeneous effects, the lower-socioeconomic status (SES) 
population is expected to suffer the most from incretion of grocery taxes if no other food 
subsidies are implemented. The substitution effect is expected to be more significant for 
lower-SES population, leading to more severe obesity problem with the increase of grocery 
sales taxes. As grocery sales taxes become relatively expensive due to the tax addition, the 
primary option to shift to is fast restaurant food (French, 2003) because fast restaurant food 
is more easily accessible (Powell et al., 2007; Rydell et al., 2008) and affordable (Khan et 
al., 2012) than groceries and other restaurant food for the lower-SES population. But there 
are large health costs of consuming fast restaurant food from a long-term perspective. It 
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can directly and indirectly cause obesity, diabetes, and other chronic cardiovascular 
diseases if fast food is regularly consumed  (Chou et al., 2004). However, Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides a protection shelter for its participants to 
offset the tax impact (Zheng et al., 2021) since the tax is exempted for the grocery 
consumption covered by SNAP. Therefore, the lower-SES population is likely to suffer the 
most from grocery taxes if without food subsidies. However, taking SNAP into 
consideration, we are not certain which income-category family suffer the most.  
In this essay, therefore, we aim to demonstrate whether grocery sales taxes make 
significant impacts on body weight outcomes. Through merging the county-level grocery 
tax data with the individual longitudinal data from Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID), 
we explore a fixed effect model to estimate the causal impact of grocery sales taxes on 
family food expenditures and individual BMI. Additionally, we conduct the analysis of 
heterogeneous effects by income category and obesity level to identify the policy impacts 
on different individuals and families. We find that a ten point-percentage increase in 
grocery sales rate leads to a rise of BMI by 0.61 (which roughly translates to a body weight 
gain of 1.68kg). The results are more significant for the overweight population whose BMI 
is greater than 25 but smaller than 30. We do not find significant results towards different 
income populations.  
There are two main contributions of this essay. This is the first paper, to my 
knowledge, trying to estimate the causal impact of grocery sales taxes on people’s body 
weight outcome. Second, based on the empirical evidence, we distinguish the policy 




The rest of the essay is arranged in the following way. In the second section, we 
review studies on all types of food and beverage taxes and summarize the impact of the 
taxes on corresponding food and beverage consumption and obesity. In the third section, 
we introduce the econometric model and the data. We then present the empirical results in 
the fourth section. In the last section, we conclude and discuss the policy implications of 
the study. 
3.2 Literature Review 
The development of how food and beverage taxes affect body weight outcome are 
shown in Figure 3.1. There are two major food and beverage taxes, grocery sales taxes and 
sin taxes. Sin taxes, including fat taxes and soda taxes, have been investigated in numerous 
studies, while the literature on grocery sales taxes is scarce. These two taxes affect body 
weight outcome through similar paths. Both taxes shift prices and affect consumption of 
food and beverages, ultimately affecting body weight (Powell & Chaloupka, 2009).  
3.2.1 Grocery Sales Taxes 
There is little literature on how grocery sales taxes affect food and beverage 
consumption and obesity, probably because of the lack of a ready dataset recording the 
county-level grocery taxes and tax changes. To our knowledge, there is only one study that 
directly reported how grocery tax changes in Kansas reshaped consumer grocery demand, 
and finally concluded that food sales are sensitive to grocery sales tax changes 
(Srithongrung, 2017). In this study, only one state is considered, and the time period of tax 
change being investigated was quite short, from 2012 to 2013. Recently, a few researchers 
have exploited nation-wide county-level grocery tax variations and published a series of 
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results of grocery tax impacts. By employing newly collected grocery tax data, they found 
that grocery sales taxes can induce people to eat out (Zheng, Dong, Burney, & Kaiser, 
2019a), aggravate food insecurity among the Non-SNAP lower-SES population (N. L. 
Wilson, Zheng, Burney, & Kaiser, 2016a), and promote obesity, which burdens public 
health costs (L. Wang et al., 2021). Nevertheless, these three studies either employ cross 
sectional individual survey data (N. L. Wilson, Zheng, Burney, & Kaiser, 2016b; Zheng et 
al., 2019a) or county-level aggregate data (L. Wang et al., 2021). There have been no 
studies that identify the causal impact of grocery sales taxes by employing individual panel 
data. Our interest using PSID data to tackle this issue stems partly from this observation. 
3.2.2 Sin Taxes of Food and Beverages  
Although there is not a federal food and beverage tax in the U.S., levels of local 
governments have levied food and beverage taxes to collect extra tax revenue since the end 
of the Great Depression (Creighton, 2010). Sin taxes are usually levied on addictive 
products, such as tobacco and alcohol, to overcome the health externalities. Nowadays, 
most food and beverage taxes, except grocery sales taxes, have been adopted as a type of 
“sin tax” by local governments (Allcott, Lockwood, & Taubinsky, 2019). The principle 
behind the “sin tax” is that some food and beverages, usually calorie-condensed, are 
unhealthy, and consuming such food becomes a sin. The purpose of the “sin taxes” is to 
control the consumption of unhealthy food and/or beverages, and therefore to prevent 
negative health outcomes, like obesity, and reduce overwhelming health costs. As “sin 
taxes” are levied in more and more places, increasing studies are promoted to examine the 




One of the most well-known “sin taxes” is the “fat tax", which was first introduced 
by Denmark in 2011 but was quickly abandoned in 2012 (Bødker, Pisinger, Toft, & 
Jørgensen, 2015). The Demark “fax tax” policy is a systematic tax reform imposing taxes 
on food that contains more saturated fat. The tax largely increased the prices of food such 
as butter, butter blends, margarine and oil. As a result, the estimated consumption of fat 
sharply shrunk by an estimated 41.8g/week (Jensen & Smed, 2013).  However, since the 
implemented period is short, no significant health impacts were found from the Danish “fat 
tax” policy.  
Inspired by the Danish “fat tax”, researchers from other European Union countries 
estimated demand system models to calculate the price, consumption and health effects of 
a hypothesized “fat tax”. For example, employing Norway consumer expenditure surveys 
of statistics, researchers found people in Norway limited their purchases of the taxed items, 
resulting in a small body weight change (Gustavsen & Rickertsen, 2013). In contrast, 
through a simulation, French researchers concluded that the “fat taxes” have few impacts 
on building healthy diets for French households because of the inelasticity of fat intake in 
France (Allais, Bertail, & Nichèle, 2020). Since the taxed items are different from country 
to country, whether fat taxes are effective is debatable depending on different studies. To 
conclude, most researchers found that simulated “fat taxes” can reduce the consumption of 
the taxed food, but the health effect is expected to be small because of the inelasticity of 
food consumption (Abdus & Cawley, 2008; Tiffin & Arnoult, 2011). Researchers agreed 
that a carefully designed food tax, usually a “fat tax” can modify people’s eating habits. 
Also, those meaningful changes in food consumption can reduce cardiovascular disease 
and prevent deaths. However, the impacts are modest and some are even insignificant 
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(Mhurchu et al., 2015; Mytton, Gray, Rayner, & Rutter, 2007). So far, there has been no 
empirical evidence employing real survey data about the impact of fat taxes on improving 
health, including whether fat taxes can reduce obesity and how much the impact could be.  
Another typical “sin tax” that is frequently adopted in the U.S. is the soda tax. There 
is more empirical evidence of this tax because soda taxes have been adopted in over two-
thirds of all states and some cities. Some studies directly estimate how the soda tax affects 
body weight outcome in reduced-form equations using self-reported body weight data from 
national cross-sectional surveys. For example, by employing the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey data, a group of researchers found that state-level 
soda taxes have a significant but small impact on weight loss for adults (J. M. Fletcher, D. 
Frisvold, & N. Tefft, 2010a). The weight-reduction impact disappears when they apply 
similar methods investigating the samples of children and adolescents (J. M. Fletcher, D. 
Frisvold, & N. Tefft, 2010b) because those populations can easily substitute other high-
calorie drinks (Fletcher et al., 2010c).  Other researchers employed scanner data to estimate 
demand systems, and through calibrating the tax with the demand system, they estimated  
how soda taxes reduced soda price and consumption (Zheng & Kaiser, 2008). Based on the 
consumption reduction, they calculated the declined calorie intake and then predict the 
transmission into weight loss (Dharmasena & Capps Jr, 2012; Zhen, Finkelstein, 
Nonnemaker, Karns, & Todd, 2014). Most of these studies confirmed the price and 
consumption effect of soda taxes (Paarlberg, Mozaffarian, & Micha, 2017; Teng et al., 
2019). The predicted weight-loss impact is usually larger than the direct estimation using 
reduced form, even when controlling the substitution to non-taxed beverages (Finkelstein 
et al., 2013).  
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After reviewing the literature, we find the causal impact of grocery taxes on health 
outcomes is still not clear with empirical evidence, and there has been no study 
investigating this impact. The goal of our research is to fill this gap.  
3.3 Econometric Model 
We use a fixed-effect model to estimate the causal impact of how grocery sales 
taxes affect individual body weight outcome (BMI) and family food expenditures. For the 
impact on individual BMI, the econometric identification can be expressed using the 
equation:  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜽𝜽𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊+ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 +
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3.8), 
where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the body mass index of individual 𝑖𝑖  residented at county 𝐺𝐺 in year 𝑅𝑅 . 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are the main independent variables representing 
total grocery sales tax rate and total restaurant sales rate of county 𝐺𝐺 in year 𝑅𝑅. 𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a 
vector including individual-level demographic characteristics, namely age, gender, race, 
marital status, whether has kids, education years, types of working industry, family income, 
participation in SNAP, time spent in housework, cigarette smoking habit, alcohol drinking 
habit and frequency of physical activity. 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 is the county-fixed effect controlling for the 
time-invariant unobserved county variables, while 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 is the year-fixed effect controlling 
for the annual time shock. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 represents a time trend at county-level, and 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error 




Our main parameter, 𝛽𝛽1, implies how changes of the county-level total grocery 
sales tax can affect individual BMI on average holding other variables constant. If 𝛽𝛽1 is 
significantly positive, it shows that imposing grocery sales tax induces body-weight gain, 
while if the parameter is significantly negative, it shows that grocery sales taxes can 
improve obesity.  
Although grocery sales tax is generally regarded exogenous to the local health 
status, we still add covariates, year-fixed effects, county-fixed effects and time trend by 
counties to identify a more accurate estimator. Aside from covariate individual 
demographics, there are unobserved factors that are associated with both grocery taxes and 
weight outcomes. Year-fixed effects are added to account for the shocks that take place in 
specific years. We also fix county effects in the regression to control for the variations 
across counties. By adding a year trend by county, we expect to avoid spurious regression 
because the average obesity is increasing during the nine years as shown in Chapter 2. In a 
nutshell, these selections on the observable and unobservable factors mitigate the potential 
omitted variable issues and unobserved endogeneity problems, providing a feasible way to 
identify unbiased health impacts of the grocery sales taxes on body weight outcomes.  
We also clustered the standard error of the estimator at county level (which is at the 
policy implementation level) to obtain an accurate statistical inference (Cameron & Miller, 
2015). There is a high possibility that the residuals are correlated within counties. For 
example, the unexplained part of the individual body weight is correlated with other 
individual’s body weights in the same county for they may have similar environment and 
culture. Thus, we employ clustered standard error instead of classic standard error to avoid 




We obtain the individual-level data and family-level data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal family survey conducted by 
University of Michigan. It mainly asks questions about income and expenditure of each 
family and family members. Further, the survey also contains food and health related 
questions and self-reported individual weight and height (Sastry, Fomby, & McGonagle, 
2018). The entire PSID dataset contains more than 18,000 individuals in over 5,000 
households. During our research period from 2006 to 2017, the survey is conducted six 
times, namely in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017, and we only include adult 
samples in our research. The weight outcome variables are separated according to head and 
wife from PSID Main Family Data. Then the weight outcome data is merged with the 
control variables which are obtained from the PSID Individual Data. At last, we merge the 
PSID data with the grocery sales tax data based on the county-level FIPS code. The FIPS 
codes of PSID families are obtained from the PSID restricted Geographic Information data. 
The grocery tax data is uniquely assembled, including state-level grocery taxes and county-
level grocery taxes from 2006 to 2017. The state-level grocery data is obtained from 
Bridging the Gap, while the county-level grocery taxes are collected from state 
Departments of Revenue and Tax-Rates.org. Totally, 3,101 counties are covered in the tax 
dataset.  
In our final merged dataset, there are 19,432 individuals from 13,949 families. In 
particular, there are 9,145 men and 10,287 women who are resident in 1,468 counties from 
51 states. In total, the dataset includes 78,872 observations. To merge with our county-
level grocery sales tax data, we only keep individuals and families who are residents in 
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counties in the merged dataset and delete the individuals and families who are resident in 
cities. We also delete the observations who refuse to report/don’t know their weights and 
heights. We calculate the BMI for each observation using the formular as: 




where the unit of the weight is kilogram, while the unit of the height is meter. Table 3.1 
presents the summary statistics (mean) of main variables. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Main Results 
Table 3.2 reports the impacts of grocery sales taxes on body weight outcomes. 
Based on Equation (3.8), the result from column (1) is estimated without any controlled 
variables while column (2) result is estimated with individual-level covariates. The 
dependent variables change to body weight measured by kilogram is shown in the results 
from the last two columns. Column (3) is estimated without individual-level covariates, 
while column (4) is estimated with the same covariates as column (2).  All the results are 
estimated with county-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, and county by year trend. 
Comparing the first two columns, the sign and magnitude of estimates are similar 
indicating that the impact of grocery sales taxes on BMI is relatively stable. Although the 
estimate from column (1) is not significant, the standard error is relatively small. With the 
individual demographic controlled, the estimate become significant at 10% significance 
level. The estimate of grocery tax on BMI is 0.061, implying that if the grocery sales tax 
increases by one percentage point, individual BMI on average increases by 0.061, holding 
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other factors constant. If we use body weight to measure the weight gain caused by grocery 
taxes, a one percentage point increase in grocery taxes leads to a gain of 0.168 kg weight 
for an average individual. To sum up, the estimates of interest are consistent with what we 
anticipate, demonstrating that increased grocery sales taxes cause individual to gain weight.   
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Impacts 
We apply the same estimation method among the population with different income, but we 
do not find grocery sales taxes have significant heterogeneous impacts. However, we find 
the taxes have more significant impact on the overweight population. The overweight 
population contains individuals whose BMI is less than (<) 30 but greater than (>=) 25 
(Flegal, Carroll, Kuczmarski, & Johnson, 1998). All the estimates of this sampled 
population are significant at 5% significance level which are stronger than the entire 
sampled population (Table 3.3), implicating that this population is more likely to be 
affected by the grocery tax changes. In addition, if we only select individuals from the 
taxed states and counties, the magnitude of the tax impact becomes larger (Table 3.4), but 
the significance does not change.  
3.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
In this article, we exam the causal impacts of grocery sales tax on body weight 
outcomes and find significant results. It is estimated that an additional ten percentage point 
increase in grocery sales rate leads to the rise of BMI by 0.61 in our preferred model. Using 
body weight measured by kilogram, this translates to a 1.68 kg increase in body weight on 
average. If we only focus on families and individuals from the taxed states and counties, 
the impacts are greater. The impact on BMI increased to 0.91 and that on body weight 
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increased to 2.69 kg, and the estimates are more significant for the overweight population.  
Given the high medical costs of obesity, whether it is worthy to levy sales taxes on grocery 
became a challenging question for those states and counties with grocery sale taxes. 
It is essential to compare grocery sales taxes and sin taxes. On one hand, both taxes 
are raised by local governments instead of federal governments, thus the two types of taxes 
have local and limited impact on the residents. Both taxes are food taxes, which affect 
obesity through changing the relative prices of food and/or beverage. However, the two 
taxes are different in root. Sin taxes are born to tackle the negative health outcomes by 
controlling certain food and/or beverage consumption; while grocery taxes are levied on 
all groceries, aiming to generate more tax revenue. Sin taxes are levied on unhealthy 
groceries like soda and sweets, while grocery sales taxes are levied on grocery food (food 
at home), which is considered healthier as compared to restaurant food (food away from 
home). Thus, if the government would like to employ tax instruments to offset the medical 
costs of obesity, it should impose sin taxes but exempt groceries. It is interesting to compare 
the impacts of levying soda taxes and exempting grocery sales taxes on the U.S. adult since 
the two food and beverage taxes have similar mechanism affecting obesity.  According to 
the most optimistic estimation in literature, imposing a 20% soda tax reduces an average 
individual’s body weight by 0.7-1.2 kg every year (Dharmasena & Capps Jr, 2012), while 
a similar amount of body weight reduction can also be achieved with decreasing grocery 
sales taxes by 4.2-7.1 point percentage.  
Since our dataset does not include municipal tax rates, ignoring municipal other 
level grocery tax rates may cause our estimates biased due to the omitted variable bias 
(OVB). If increasing municipal tax rates can also cause obesity, and municipal tax rates 
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are positively related with county grocery sales tax rates. Then our estimates are 
overestimated. Additionally, the investigation does not consider the tax rebates. However, 
there are only three states that allow refunding grocery sales taxes to low-income, disabled, 
old and pregnant populations. We are not able to obtain information about these 
populations. Omitting the refunding populations can also slightly biased our estimates.  
While this is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to empirically examine 
the causal impacts of grocery sales tax on body weight gain using individual longitudinal 
data, we recognize that it is only a first step towards full identification. To get a full picture 
of the health impacts of grocery sales tax, it is necessary to test the causal link on how 
grocery sales taxes affect food consumption patterns, followed by how the changes in food 
consumption patterns affect consumers’ health. As such, scanner data that can track 
individual food consumption behavior and health outcomes could be helpful for fully 




Tables and Figures for Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics (Mean) 
Variable Unit All Men Women 
BMI NA 27.494 27.703 27.323 
Weight Kg 82.150 90.553 75.281 
Grocery Tax % 1.309 1.27 1.34 
Restaurant Tax % 6.466 6.433 6.493 
Age Years 45.238 45.307 45.181 
White % 0.502 0.563 0.452 
Hispanic % 0.027 0.029 0.247 
Black % 0.177 0.183 0.173 
Married % 0.673 0.758 0.604 
Have Kid % 0.445 0.413 0.471 
Family Income $ 78042.63 83954.6 73216.3 
Education Years Years 15.151 15.208 15.104 
SNAP % 0.151 0.112 0.183 
HouseWork Hours per Week 11.885 8.183 14.92 
Cigrettes Per Day Number 3.788 5.028 2.77 
Drinking Alcohol % 0.614 0.685 0.555 
Physical Activity Hours per Week 2.149 2.43 1.92 
     
Numbers of 
Observations 
 78,872 35,449 43,423 




Table 3.2 Impacts of Grocery Sales Taxes on BMI and Body Weight  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES BMI BMI Weight Weight 
     
Grocery Tax 0.052 0.061* 0.189* 0.168* 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.102) (0.095) 
Restaurant Tax -0.051 -0.076* 0.001 -0.157 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.136) (0.130) 
     
Controls N Y N Y 
County FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Time Trend Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 78,786 77,769 78,786 77,769 
R-squared 0.142 0.164 0.151 0.27 
Note: The estimated results are shown in four columns from column (1) to column (4). 
Column (1) and (3) do not contain control variables. The dependent variable in column (1) 
and (2) are BMI, and the dependent variable in column (3) and (4) are Weight by kilogram. 





Table 3.3 Impacts of Grocery Sales Taxes on Weight Outcomes for the Over -Weight  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES BMI BMI Weight Weight      
Grocery Tax 0.048** 0.051** 0.143** 0.150**  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.067) (0.067) 
Restaurant Tax -0.002 -0.004 -0.035 -0.04  
(0.026) (0.026) (0.079) (0.078)      
Controls N Y N Y 
County FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Time Trend Y Y Y Y      
Observations 26,598 26,230 26,598 26,230 
R-squared 0.142 0.148 0.868 0.868 
Note: The estimated results are shown in four columns from column (1) to column (4). 
Column (1) and (3) do not contain control variables. The dependent variable in column 
(1) and (2) are BMI, and the dependent variable in column (3) and (4) are Weight by 






Table 3.4 Impacts of Grocery Sales Taxes on Weight Outcomes (Taxed County Sample)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES BMI BMI Weight Weight      
Grocery Tax 0.079 0.091* 0.241* 0.269*  
(0.053) (0.054) (0.145) (0.144) 
Restaurant Tax -0.075 -0.091 -0.192 -0.245  
(0.084) (0.083) (0.226) (0.224)      
Controls N Y N Y 
County FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Time Trend Y Y Y Y      
Observations 27,460 27,063 27,460 27,063 
R-squared 0.166 0.184 0.319 0.334 
Note: The estimated results are shown in four columns from column (1) to column (4). 
Column (1) and (3) do not contain control variables. The dependent variable in column 
(1) and (2) are BMI, and the dependent variable in column (3) and (4) are Weight by 









Notes: FAH represents food at home, while FAFH represents food away from home. 
Figure 3.1 Literature of How Food Taxes Affect Body Weight Outcomes  
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CHAPTER 4. THE DIVERSITY OF GROCERY SALES TAX RATES IN THE U.S.: EVIDENCE 
FROM MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNMENT INTERACTION 
4.1 Introduction 
Groceries are taxed at diverse rates across the U.S. In some places, grocery sales 
taxes are exempted at the state and/or county level, while in other places, the tax rate can 
be as high as 9%, including the state tax rate and county tax rate. The divergent tax rates 
lead to continual public discussions and political proposals on cutting and even repealing 
the grocery sales taxes in the 16 with-tax states every year. In this essay, we discuss the 
causes of diverse grocery tax rates in a framework of local tax competition by considering 
the horizontal, vertical and diagonal tax effects at the state and county level. 
From a historical perspective, states followed a spatial pattern exempting state-level 
sales taxes on groceries, which occurred successively in three waves. The first wave of the 
tax exemption started in the Great Depression of the 1930s, when general sales taxes were 
firstly introduced, and grocery foods were excluded from being taxed. Those states in the 
first wave are California, Texas, and most northeastern states. The second wave of 
exempting grocery sales taxes was triggered by Iowa in the early 1970s, followed by other 
middle eastern states including Michigan, Washington D.C., Indiana, Kentucky and North 
Dakota over the 1980s. During the second wave, some western states, including 
Washington, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, and Nebraska, exempted their taxes as well. The 
last wave of grocery sales tax exemptions happened at the start of the third millennium, 
when more and more southern states, such as Georgia, Louisiana, North and South 




More recently, from 2006 to 2017, the grocery tax rates at state level have been 
decreasing on average, according to the data we collected. Among the seven states that 
changed the tax during those twelve years, six states dropped the state grocery tax rates, 
while Kansas is the only one state that slightly increased its state grocery tax rates from 
5.3% in 2006 to 6.5% in 2017 (Figure 4.1). In particular, Wyoming, South Carolina and 
West Virginia consecutively exempted the grocery taxes during the study period. County-
level grocery tax rates also frequently change. More than 100 counties changed grocery 
sales tax rates over 300 times during the research period. However, contradictory to the 
decreasing state-level grocery tax rates, county-level grocery tax rates have been 
increasing. The average county-level grocery tax rate increased by 0.4-point percentage 
between 2006 and 2017. It is also noticeable that even in some states, such as Georgia, 
Louisiana and North Carolina, where state-level grocery taxes are exempted, there are still 
considerable amount of county-level grocery taxes. 
The tax policy is so divergent from state to state, from county to county, and 
between states and counties that the cause of grocery tax rate changes becomes an 
intriguing phenomenon. In this article, in order to explore the causes of grocery sales tax 
changes, we consider spatial externalities of grocery tax rates and study the state-county 
and county-county tax policy interaction patterns under a Stackelberg tax competition 
model. Derivatized from the model, we obtain three propositions. County-level grocery tax 
rates are affected by their domestic states’ grocery tax rates (the vertical-effect 
proposition), the neighboring counties’ grocery tax rates (the horizontal-effect proposition) 
and the neighboring states’ grocery tax rates (the diagonal-effect proposition) (Agrawal, 
2016). In addition, by employing the newly assembled twelve-year data of state and county 
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grocery tax rates, this essay also empirically examines the three propositions using a spatial 
autoregressive model.   
Our study contributes to the tax and food inequality literature, as well as practical 
policy making in broad ways. First, it is the first study, to our knowledge, that explains 
patterns and reasons for the changes of county-level grocery sales tax rates. Second, we 
also expand state-county interaction on the grocery sales tax rate by allowing the diagonal 
interaction where counties’ grocery tax rates are affected also by neighboring states’ tax 
rates. There are theories about state-county federalism, but the empirical evidence is rare 
considering nation-wide counties and a more than ten-year study period. In this study, we 
investigate not only the horizontal competition, but also vertical and diagonal interaction 
between upper-tier governments (states) and lower-tier governments (counties) nationally 
from a decade-long perspective. Third, we first use a Stackelberg game model to mimic 
the tax competition between the two-level governments. In our model, since states are 
upper-tier governments, they are the tax leaders in the game, while counties, as the lower-
tier governments, usually follow the state leaders setting their tax rates. Compared to the 
simultaneous gaming between the two-level governments, our model is more practical and 
closer to reality.  Finally, it is well acknowledged that local governments compete for major 
tax categories such as property tax, income tax and general sales tax, but there is limited 
research examining whether governments also compete on other local specific tax 
categories, such as grocery sales taxes. As more and more local governments explore food 
and beverage taxes as policy instruments, our study fills this gap by providing evidence 
that local governments tend to interact with their upper-level governments and neighboring 
governments competing on grocery sales tax rates. 
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The rest of the essay is organized in the following way. The next section reviews 
previous research on grocery sales taxes and the tax competition. The third section presents 
a theoretical approach to how states and counties set optimal tax rates in a Stackelberg 
gaming model. The subsequent sections illustrate the data and classifications, followed by 
the empirical strategies and econometric method. Then, we present and analyze the results 
in the sixth section. Finally, we summarize and discuss the policy implication in the last 
section. 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Grocery Sales Taxes 
Grocery sales taxes have impacted people’s lifestyle and even the society in 
multiple ways. On the one hand, the taxes imposing on food broadly influence consumer 
behaviors related to food. First, the substitution effect of the grocery sales taxes influenced 
public eating habits. Levying taxes on groceries makes grocery foods more expensive than 
restaurant food so that more people are likely to eat away from home. As a result, restaurant 
food expenditure grows while grocery food expenditure drops, and such substitution exists 
in families across all income levels (Zheng, Dong, Burney, & Kaiser, 2019). This effect is 
fully discussed in the previous two essays and can lead to severe problems on public health. 
Second, grocery sales taxes are extra expenses added on the original food prices, which 
ultimately raised food expenditures and aggravated food insecurity due to the shrinking 
food budget among the low-SEC families. Although the tax does not apply to purchases 
using SNAP, it largely increased the possibility of being insecure for the low-income but 
non-participating SNAP households (N. L. Wilson, Zheng, Burney, & Kaiser, 2017). 
50 
 
Third, grocery sales taxes directly increase cross-border grocery shopping. A cohort of 
studies reported that when 46 counties in West Virginia changed their county-level grocery 
sales taxes during 1979-1984, consumers travelled from places of higher grocery sales 
taxes to the close-by places of lower grocery sales taxes to shop for groceries (Walsh & 
Jones, 1988). The cross-border shopping boosted again in West Virginia when the state 
started to reduce and finally exempt its state-level grocery sales taxes gradually in the 
1990s (Tosun & Skidmore, 2007).  
On the other hand, the grocery sales taxes may introduce a profound influence on 
public health and other social outcomes. Since grocery sales taxes can change and guide 
consumers’ eating behavior, the public health outcomes are subsequently affected by the 
tax (Cawley & Ruhm, 2011). Besides the evidence provided in the previous two essays of 
this dissertation, food and beverage taxes are frequently correlated with obesity issues 
(Cawley, 2015).  Furthermore, grocery sales taxes can also lead to other social problems. 
Researchers found that grocery sales taxes cause unemployment in the food and beverage 
industries, especially among young and female workers (Greenhalgh‐Stanley, Rohlin, & 
Thompson, 2018). 
While the consequences of grocery sales taxes have been investigated by a range 
of researchers, the causes of grocery sales taxes have never been thoroughly discussed. 
There are limited academic discussions on  why grocery sales tax changes, even though 




4.2.2 Tax Competition Theory 
It is straight-forward to attribute the tax-exemption to a tax competition model, 
where governments compete with each other for a lower sales tax rate. This is supported 
by the spatial tax competition theory (Agrawal, Hoyt, & Wilson; J. D. Wilson, 1999). As 
is assumed in the theory, the consumers are mobile for tax arbitrage to maximize their 
utility (Mintz & Tulkens, 1986), so local governments from the same tier compete 
horizontally, choosing the optimal taxes in order to maximize their government revenue 
(Kanbur & Keen, 1993). In the Nash equilibrium of the horizontal competition, an increase 
of commodity tax in a high-tax region encourages its residents to cross the region border 
to shop in the nearby low-tax regions if the marginal revenue of the shopping trip exceed 
the marginal transportation costs (Ohsawa, 1999). As a result, the competing governments 
take turns offering as low as possible sales tax rates in the sales tax competition, not only 
to encourage their residential consumers to consume at their own region, but also to attract 
more consumers from other regions (Y.-Q. Wang, 1999). In a nutshell, the competition 
always leads to declining tax rates for all the competing regions (Haufler, 1998), although 
only the governments with lower sales tax rates are capable of enlarging their sales tax 
revenue (Braid, 2000).  
The tax exemption for groceries become more complicated considering the vertical 
externalities where different levels of regional governments jointly compete for the same 
sales tax bases (Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, 2001). In a non-cooperative equilibrium, the 
vertical externalities can adversely balance the excessively low tax rates caused by the 
horizontal competitions (M. Keen & Kotsogiannis, 2003; M. J. Keen & Kotsogiannis, 
2004), and sometimes the vertical externalities can even dominate the competition, 
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resulting in excessively high local tax rates (M. J. Keen & Kotsogiannis, 2002). Currently, 
counties adopting Home-Rule have more flexibility to impose local sales taxes within their 
regions in the U.S. (Veuger, Shoag, & Tuttle, 2019), which promotes the vertical 
interactions on sales tax rates (Burge & Rogers, 2011). However, the upper-level 
governments gain the advantage over the lower-level governments in the frame of 
federalism (Lucas, 2004), and thus, a state usually plays as a tax policy leader followed by 
its counties in the state-county sales tax interaction. This is especially true in the regions 
governed by Dillon Rule (Russell & Bostrom, 2016), where counties obtain the authority 
to levy taxes from their states, which leads those counties to keep the same policy pattern 
as their states. Furthermore, some recent literature also found that the sales taxation of a 
lower-tier region is also positively influenced by the tax rates of its neighboring upper-tier 
governments and the distances to the region border (Agrawal, 2016), mixing the vertical 
externalities with the horizontal externalities(Agrawal, 2015). 
4.3 Theoretical Model 
We expand the tax competition model  (Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2007) 
to a sequential government game. States and counties act in a Stackelberg competition, 
where the upper-tier governments move first(Y.-Q. Wang, 1999). As the tax leaders in the 
Stackelberg model, states compete for the state tax rates first. Then, counties observe the 
state rates and compete for county tax rates. We also assume that governments at the same 
tier move simultaneously to find a Nash equilibrium. Similar to the two-level (Agrawal, 
2016) and multi-level models (Agrawal, 2016; Janeba & Osterloh, 2013), our theoretical 
model focuses on the tax interaction among two-level local governments. 
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4.3.1 Model Framework 
Assume there are two states (𝐵𝐵 and 𝐽𝐽) located on a line segment, and each state has 
one county (𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗). Sharing the same tax base, each level government can set their own 
commodity tax rate freely. The tax is levied based on the transaction location. Governments 
are revenue maximizers. States and counties follow a Stackelberg game taking turns setting 
tax rates. Since states are higher-level governments, in the first stage, states take the lead, 
setting the state-level tax rates (𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 and 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽) to maximize state revenue. The state-level tax 
rates are set simultaneously between states. Then, in the second stage, counties observe the 
state-level tax rates and simultaneously set the county-level tax rates ( 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  and 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 ) to 
maximize county revenue. We assume symmetry between same-level governments. 
Assume the producer price of commodity (p) is the same in every county and is 
normalized into 1:  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 1. Then the consumer price of commodity in county i is 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 =
1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 . The consumers maximize their utilities by consuming commodities, where 
their indirect utility 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞) = max
𝑥𝑥
{𝑅𝑅(𝐺𝐺) − 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺}  and the consumer demand 𝐺𝐺(𝑞𝑞) =
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺{𝑅𝑅(𝐺𝐺) − 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺}.  
We also assume the population is normalized at unit, and the transportation price is 
fixed at 𝐺𝐺. Then, consumers living in 𝑖𝑖 will cross-board shop in j only if 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖>𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗, and the 
distance constraints for cross-border shopping is 𝑑𝑑 <  1
𝑖𝑖
(𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) − 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗)). Therefore, the 
tax base of county 𝑖𝑖  allowing cross-border shopping to county 𝑗𝑗  is 𝐵𝐵�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗� = �1 +






As a result, state 𝐵𝐵 choses 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 to maximize its state-level tax revenue 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼:max𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 =
𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵�1 +  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 , 1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽�. Simultaneously, state 𝐽𝐽 chooses 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽  to maximize its state-
level tax revenue 𝑅𝑅𝐽𝐽 . Then, county 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 observe the state tax rates and choose their 
optimal tax rates. The tax revenue maximization for county i is max
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵�1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +
𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 , 1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽�. 
4.3.2 Solving the Model 
We use backward induction to solve the model. In Stage 2, counties take states’ tax rates 
as given and set county-level tax rates simultaneously. Then the F.O.C. (First Order 
Condition) for county i is: 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
= 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
= 0 (4.1) 




, we can solve the equilibrium 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 taking 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 as given, and the equilibrium 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 





Since 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 , as a result, 𝜌𝜌𝐺𝐺2(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) − 𝐺𝐺′(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) > 0 . Additionally, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  solves the 




Back to stage 1, states know the reactions of counties and set their optimal state 





= 𝐵𝐵 + 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
= 0 (4.3) 







If the symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, plugging 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼) according to equation 















Proposition 1. In the Stackelberg game of two-level governments where 
Stackelberg equilibrium exists between different-tier governments and symmetric Nash 
equilibrium exists among governments from same tiers, the slope of vertical reaction 
function is negative if the county tax rate is greater than (or equal to) its domestic state’s 
state-level tax rate, while the slope of vertical reaction function is positive if the county tax 
rate is less than its domestic state’s state-level tax rate. 







If 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 , then 
𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
≥ 0 . A county’s tax rate increases with the increase of its 
domestic state’s state-level tax rate. However, when 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 < 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼, a county’s tax rate decreases 
with the increase of its domestic state’s state-level tax rate.  
Proposition 2. In the Stackelberg game of two-level governments where 
Stackelberg equilibrium exists between different-tier governments and symmetric Nash 
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equilibrium exists among governments from same tiers, the slope of horizontal reaction 
function is positive. It means a county’s county-level tax rate is positively affected by the 
county-level tax rate of its neighbor county. 
With the totally differentiation of equation (4.1) in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, 






































Proposition 3. In the Stackelberg game of two-level governments where 
Stackelberg equilibrium exists between different-tier governments and symmetric Nash 
equilibrium exists among governments from same tiers, the slope of diagonal reaction 
function (Agrawal, 2016) is positive. This means a county’s county-level tax rate is 
positively affected by its neighbor states’ state-level tax rates, but the magnitude is smaller 
than the neighboring counties’ tax effect.  
With the total differentiation of equation (4.1) in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, 








































4.4 Data and Government Tax Strategies 
We use a unique grocery tax panel that is hand-assembled from various data 
sources. The dataset contains annual state and county level grocery tax rates from 2006 to 
2017. The state level grocery tax rates are obtained from Bridging the Gap, while the 
county level grocery tax rates are gathered from Tax-Rates.org and state Departments of 
Revenue. Our data covers all the counties in the mainland U.S., the four main areas in 
Alaska, and all the five counties of Hawaii. Comparing with the previous tax competition 
datasets of sales taxes (Agrawal, 2016), one shortcomings of our dataset are that it does not 
contain municipal tax rates. We are unable to know how municipal-level governments 
interact with upper-level governments and their neighboring jurisdictions.  
The summary statistics of grocery tax rates are shown in Table 4.2. Overall, during 
our study period, among the 50 states, Washington D.C., and 3,101 counties, there have 
been 16 states and 1,036 counties that have implemented the grocery tax policy. For those 
with grocery taxes, the average state-level grocery tax rate is 3.644%, with 1% as the 
minimum and 7% as the maximum, while the average county-level grocery tax rate is 
2.016%, ranging from 0.15% to 7%.  
Sharing the same tax base, states and counties can implement their own tax 
strategies. States can choose to exempt taxes (state grocery tax rate = 0), tax at limited tax 
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rates, or tax at full tax rates (state grocery tax rate = state general sales tax rate). 
Correspondingly, counties can also have similar tax strategies. However, some counties 
are not authorized to freely set their own county tax rates, but instead follow the state 
strategies by setting their county tax rate at a fixed and united number statewide. 
The diverse vertical interaction between states and counties should theoretically 
form 64 (4*4*4) taxing strategies between the two-level government, but only seven types 
of the strategies existed among the U.S. state and county governments (Table 1). The most 
frequent tax strategy is double exempt, where states and counties choose to exempt both 
levels of grocery tax rates. The second popular strategy adopted by the eight states is the 
double full, where states and counties choose to tax both at full general sales tax rates. 
There are five states that choose to exempt the state-level tax rate, while their counties 
choose to tax. Similarly, there are also four states where states choose to tax a limited rate 
but counties tax fully; in these counties’ their taxing strategies are more radical than states.  
Our research also controls the county-level demographic variables such as race, 
gender, per capita income, and unemployment rates. The demographic data used are from 
the U.S. government census.  
4.5 Empirical Strategies 
We apply similar the empirical equation form as Agrawal (2014), but we also 
consider the sequential gaming between states and counties, where states are leaders. 
Therefore, the tax reaction function of county i within state I in year y considering vertical, 
horizontal, and diagonal tax effects is established as follows: 
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𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜽𝜽𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4.8), 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the county-level tax rate of county i within state I in year y. 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−1 is the state-
level tax rate of state I in year 𝐺𝐺 − 1. We use 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−1 instead of 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 to mimic the sequential 
gaming. Since states are leaders in setting tax rates, we assume counties start to set tax rates 
in year 𝐺𝐺 one year after states set their tax rates. Similarly, 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the county-level tax rate 
of county j within state 𝐽𝐽 in year y.  𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is a spatial weighting matrix based on the polygon 
contiguity between county i and county j, indicating whether county i and j are neighboring 
counties. 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖−1  is the state-level tax rate of state 𝐽𝐽 in year 𝐺𝐺 − 1. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽 is another spatial 
weighting matrix based on the polygon contiguity between county 𝑖𝑖 and state 𝐽𝐽, indicating 
whether county i is near the state border. 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a vector containing time variant controls 
related to the economy, politics and socio-demographic variables that are correlated to the 
local grocery sales tax, such as per capital income, the unemployment rate, race and gender. 
The controlling vector also includes current state grocery sales taxes 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 and 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖. At 
last, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the county-fixed effect controlling for the time-invariant unobserved variables, 
and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the year fixed effect controlling for annual shocks. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the error term.  
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is an element of the spatial contiguity matrix 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,  
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = �
1 if i and j are contiguous
0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 𝑗𝑗 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  (4.9). 
Similarly, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽 is an element of the spatial contiguity matrix 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽. The Queen criterion is 
used in the binary contiguity, where neighboring jurisdictions are defined as sharing either 
common border or vertex. Both matrixes are normalized in rows. 
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Under this identification, 𝛽𝛽1� ,  𝛽𝛽2� , and  𝛽𝛽3�  are the estimated slopes of vertical, 
horizontal and diagonal reactions, accounting for the vertical, horizontal and diagonal tax 
effects. The parameters are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
method. Since the counties could cluster in group, clustered standard errors at state level 
are considered to obtain accurate statistic inference (Cameron & Miller, 2015).  
4.6 Results 
Our estimates are presented in Table 4.3. Considering all the states and counties in 
our sample, the estimates of 𝛽𝛽1 , 𝛽𝛽2 , and 𝛽𝛽3 are -0.102, 0.780, and 0.110, respectively, 
shown in column (2). However, not all the three estimates are statistically significant. The 
negative coefficient of the state grocery tax rate suggests that state grocery sales taxes 
negatively affected county grocery sales taxes. Although the estimate is not statistically 
significant, the clustered standard error is relatively small. This estimate result is consistent 
with proposition 1. Given the average state grocery sales tax rate (3.644%) is greater than 
the average county grocery sales tax rate (2.016%), a county grocery tax rate changes 
negatively with its domestic state grocery sales tax rate.  
Neighboring counties play the largest role in determining the local county grocery 
tax rates. A county will increase its grocery tax rates by 0.78 percentage points if its 
neighboring county increases its tax rate by one percentage point tax rate on average. The 
estimate is statistically significant at 10% significance level. Neighboring state tax rates 
can also affect a county’s grocery tax rate. A county is expected to increase its grocery tax 
rate by 0.11 percentage point when its neighboring states increase state grocery tax rate by 
one percentage point on average, holding other variables constant. This estimate is 
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statistically significant at 1% significance level. To compare the diagonal tax effect with 
the horizontal tax effect, the estimated diagonal tax effect is smaller than the horizontal tax 
effect, suggesting that neighboring states have limited tax effect on counties. Furthermore, 
the Wald test result shows that the spatial parameter coefficients are significantly different 
from zero, indicating that county grocery tax rates are spatially correlated with the tax rates 
of neighboring counties and states. 
Since there are 31 states and their corresponding counties that have adopted a 
double exempt strategy, the spatial correlations are overestimated by taking them into 
consideration. In column (3) and (4), we exclude Type 1 jurisdictions (Table 4.1) where 
double exempt strategies are adopted, and only include the remaining 20 states and their 
corresponding counties. The signals of the main estimates stay the same, but the magnitude 
of the three effects get smaller. The empirical results are consistent with the derived 
propositions in our theoretical model.  
4.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
During the past two decades, seven more states consecutively exempted groceries 
from sales taxes. Although there are still thirteen states remained holding the grocery sales 
taxes, five of them levy the taxes at limited rates, and three of them provide different levels 
of tax refund credits. At least at the state level, exemption, as well as reduction in grocery 
sales taxes has become a trend. Many governments exempted the tax in terms of equality 
since most jurisdictions have already exempted taxing groceries. Additionally, grocery 
taxes exaggerate inequality as the low-SES populations tend to spend a larger proportion 
of their income on groceries. 
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It is an important decision for all levels of local governments regarding whether to 
tax groceries. A growing number of researchers and policy makers have been exploring 
how food and beverage taxes can impact consumers’ eating and drinking behavior 
(Fletcher et al., 2010c; Zhen et al., 2014). Grocery taxes gain the advantages as such a 
policy instrument since they are imposed on wider types of groceries than most single food 
and beverage taxes which only tax a specific type of groceries. The impacts of grocery 
sales taxes are more salient than the single base taxes such as fat taxes and sweetened 
beverage taxes.  
Our study, in a framework of tax competition, investigates that the driven factors 
of county grocery sales tax rate changes come from three sources: its neighboring county’s 
grocery tax rates have a positive horizontal effect, its mother state government has a 
negative vertical effect, and its neighboring state governments have a slightly positive 
diagonal effect. Our research confirms the tax competition theory in grocery sales taxes 
that multi-level local governments interacted in a game. Governments choose grocery tax 
rates to maximize government revenue considering cross-border shopping and federalism. 
Additionally, the findings help to explain the diversity of grocery sales tax rates. The 
diverse tax rates are not only due to horizontal competition but are also results of diverse 
interacted strategies between states and counties. Furthermore, as increasing numbers of 
states and counties consider changing their grocery tax policies, our study addresses the 
interaction among multi-level governments, helping policy makers to balance the costs and 




Tables and Figures of Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 Vertical Taxing Strategy Types, 2006-2017 
  
 
Type1 Type2 Type3 Type4 Type5 Type6 Type7 
Vertical Interaction Strategies 
State 
Exempt Y Y Y Y 
   
Limited 
    
Y Y 
 
Full             Y 
County 
Exempt Y 











    
Full 




         
Numbers of States 31 1 2 2 3 4 8 



















Notes: a. The table is generated using our state and county tax dataset.  
b. The Type 1 states include AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, FL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, 
MI, MN, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, TX, VT, WA, and WI.  
c. In 2009 and 2013, Wyoming and West Virginia exempted grocery taxes at state and 
county levels.  
d. Georgia exempted state-level grocery taxes in 2000, while Louisiana and North Carolina 
exempted state-level grocery taxes in 2002. But county-level grocery taxes are permitted 




Table 4.2 Grocery Sales Tax Rates at State and County Levels, 2006-2017  
State County 
Grocery Tax Rate (Mean) 3.644% 2.016% 
Grocery Tax Rate (Min) 1.000% 0.150% 
Grocery Tax Rate (Max) 7.000% 7.000% 
Numbers of With-Tax 




Table 4.3 Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Tax Effect Results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  All States All States 
Judications 
with Taxes 
State Tax Rate (𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼) -0.102 -0.102 -0.084 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Average Neighboring County Tax Rate 
(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗) 0.781*** 0.780*** 0.760*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
Average Neighboring State Tax Rate 
(𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐽𝐽𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽) 0.109* 0.110* 0.091* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
    
Controlling Variables N Y Y 
County Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
Counties 3,101 3,101 1,432 
Observations 34,111 34,111 15,752 



























APPENDIX 1. ABBREVIATIONS 
COVID-19: coronavirus disease 2019 
BMI: body mass index 
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
BRFSS: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
REIS: Regional Economic Information System 
UCR: Uniform Crime Reporting 
DUI: driving under the influence 
BCR: benefit-cost ratio 
SES: socioeconomic status 
FAH: food at home 
FAFH: food away from home 
SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
PSID: Panel Study of Income Dynamics  
FE: Fixed Effect 
OVB: omitted variable bias 







APPENDIX 2.  Full Regression Results Health Outcomes on Grocery and Restaurant Sales 
Taxes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES obesity diabetes obesity diabetes 
          
Total grocery sales tax rate 0.588*** 0.215**   
 (0.154) (0.098)   
Total restaurant sales tax rate -0.158 -0.127   
 (0.127) (0.101)   
(1+Grocery Tax)/(1+Restaurant Tax)   4.760*** 1.296** 
   (1.169) (0.571) 
Grocery stores -0.244 -1.113*** -0.215 -1.101*** 
 (1.262) (0.406) (1.258) (0.408) 
Fastfood restaurants -0.377 0.289 -0.377 0.292 
 (0.569) (0.228) (0.570) (0.228) 
Full-service restaurants 0.080 -0.063 0.091 -0.062 
 (0.517) (0.181) (0.518) (0.183) 
Cost per meal -0.735* -0.512*** -0.720* -0.522*** 
 (0.386) (0.182) (0.385) (0.184) 
White 11.058 1.993 11.088 1.994 
 (14.889) (5.913) (14.926) (5.901) 
Black 53.462** 23.179*** 53.523** 22.997*** 
 (24.510) (7.179) (24.572) (7.167) 
Female -15.464 -5.143 -15.609 -5.151 
 (17.564) (7.582) (17.481) (7.566) 
Hispanic -19.896* -5.802 -19.886* -5.607 
 (10.077) (5.561) (10.054) (5.523) 
Income per capita 0.025* 0.010 0.026* 0.010 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) 
Employees' share of total population -7.258* -1.045 -7.353* -1.011 
 (3.752) (1.161) (3.762) (1.168) 
Share of bachelor’s degree or higher 
of the 25-year- and-over population -0.032 -0.016 -0.032 -0.016 (0.045) (0.018) (0.045) (0.018) 
Smoking rate 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 
 (0.030) (0.008) (0.030) (0.008) 
Drinking rate -0.020 -0.010 -0.020 -0.010 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.023) (0.014) 
Drug arrest rate 4.294*** -1.055*** 4.290*** -1.054*** 
 (0.241) (0.125) (0.240) (0.125) 
DUI -5.908*** 1.619*** -5.903*** 1.619*** 
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(0.384) (0.176) (0.384) (0.178) 
Constant 32.161* 11.305 30.258 10.356 
 (18.835) (7.253) (18.697) (7.262) 
     
Observations 9,779 9,779 9,779 9,779 
R-squared 0.910 0.928 0.910 0.928 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, 
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